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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper will examine the results of the strategic actions of AirAsia in the Malaysian domestic 
airline market.  Firstly, the paper will provide a general background of the airline industry, in 
particular the Malaysian domestic airline market and a summary of an analysis of the industry using 
Michael Porter’s Five Forces Analysis. Secondly, the paper will provide a brief background of 
AirAsia and Malaysia Airlines. Thirdly, the paper will analyse the results of AirAsia’s strategy vis-à-
vis operating and financial performance. Finally, the paper will conclude a summary of AirAsia’s 
achievement of the past and present and prospect for the future. 
 
 
INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 
 
Airline Industry 
 
The airline industry is very competitive with existing airlines having to compete with each other as well as 
with new entrants from time to time.  For every success such as Singapore Airlines and Southwest Airlines, there are 
plenty of failures such as Pan Am, TWA, Swissair, Sabena, Ansett, People Express, Go, Buzz and so on. 
 
Major Characteristics 
 
There are three major characteristics of the airline industry namely its product nature, its expenditure 
structure and its market entry conditions. Airlines’ product is homogeneous or undifferentiated, causing significant 
competition in markets, which are free from regulations and economic barriers. High capital and operating 
expenditure is another important characteristic of the airline industry. Aircrafts, airlines’ major capital expenditure, are 
very costly to acquire. For operating expenditures, aviation fuel and labour make up the two major costs in the 
industry.  
 
Another important characteristic of the industry is the conditions for market entry, which differs between 
international and domestic markets. In the international market, entry is very difficult as international flights and 
routes are the results of bilateral negotiations between governments. On the other hand, in the domestic and regional 
markets, entry depends on the level of deregulation or liberalisation. More and more countries, however, are opening 
up their domestic markets for more competition. In addition, government plays an important role to regulate the 
markets and existing players may have significant influence over new entrants.  
 
Forces Driving the Industry 
 
The major factors driving the industry are the global economy and safety issues. When the world or any 
region of it is in an economic downturn, the demand for airline services will fall. The late 1990’s Asian Financial 
Crisis, for example, resulted in minimal increase in the number of worldwide airline passengers increased only 
minimally from 1997 to 1998. Safety issues are also an important driver of the industry, which is subject to very 
stringent safety standards. In addition, there are also unexpected safety related events such as the 11 September 2001 
tragedy in the US and the recent Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome outbreak in East Asia, which caused reduction 
in passengers.  
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New Trend in the Industry 
 
The increasing popularity of low cost airlines is the newest trend in the airline industry. In the past few years, 
we have seen the rise of low cost airlines such as AmericaWest, JetBlue and AirTran in the US, Ryanair and easyJet in 
Europe and Virgin Blue in Australia. The new trend is an old concept pioneered by the US-based Southwest Airlines 
in the early 1970’s. From then onwards, the concept caught on with many airlines adopting it. The share of low cost 
airlines in the US and European markets is steadily increasing.  
 
Table 1 in the Appendix outlines, the “Southwest Strategy”, the basis of most low cost airlines operations. 
The key of the strategy is to reduce costs while at the same time offering low prices to passengers. History showed 
that the strategy is easy to replicate but difficult to implement successfully. 
 
Malaysian Domestic Airline Market 
 
Before we delve further into the case study, it is important to have a background of the Malaysian domestic 
airline market by understanding the importance of its role in the country and having a concise history of the industry. 
 
Role of Airline Travel 
 
Airline travel within Malaysia is a critical means of transportation between the two distinct parts of the 
country, East Malaysia on the island of Borneo and West Malaysia on the Malay Peninsular. Due to geography, the 
options available to for travel across the South China Sea are airplanes and ships. 
 
Another critical function of the airline travel is to connect the major towns and the remote interior areas 
within East Malaysia, which has poor road systems and limited availability of other significant means of 
transportation. In contrast, West Malaysia has more developed and extensive road and railway systems. Therefore, 
airline travel is not the main mode of long distance transportation in this part of Malaysia. 
 
In addition, it is often mentioned that airline travel plays an important role in nation building as it facilitates 
in uniting and integrating the citizens on both sides of the South China Sea.  Airline travel also plays a crucial role in 
supporting economic activities such as tourism. 
 
History of Airline Travel 
 
The history of domestic airline travel started in 1947 with the first passenger service from Singapore to Kuala 
Lumpur. From the 1970’s, the domestic airline industry has always been dominated by the national career, Malaysia 
Airlines, which flies to between East and West Malaysia as well as within East and West Malaysia. In early 1990’s, 
the domestic market was opened to more competition, with a number of new airlines starting services within the 
country (Sakran, 2002). The majority of the new entrants, however, served a very limited number of destinations and 
therefore, were never a threat to Malaysia Airlines’ dominance.  
 
Industry Analysis of the Malaysian Domestic Airline Market 
 
Using Porter’s five-force framework to understand the competitive structure of industries, we can conclude 
that the industry has a high entry barriers, it is moderately competitive and has minimal threat from substitute 
products, suppliers and buyers. While these factors make market an attractive to enter, high entry barriers await any 
potential new entrants.  
 
Rivalry Among Existing Competitors 
 
The industry is moderately competitive despite having only two major airlines. However, AirAsia is steadily 
being threatening the dominance of Malaysia Airlines. 
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The Threat of Entry 
 
The industry has a moderate to high barriers of entry. A new small airline serving one or two routes may 
enter easily. However, given past experiences, a larger airline serving multiple routes may be harder. The 
transformation of present small airlines into a larger airline is probably more likely to be successful as in AirAsia’s 
case. Access to capital and labour are the major obstacles for new entrants.  
 
Pressure from Substitute Products and Support from Complements 
 
The industry is characterised by very low or minimal pressure from substitute products. The role of 
complements has yet to be tapped fully. 
 
Power of Input Suppliers 
 
The industry is characterised by low to medium power of input suppliers. It is highly unlikely that any one 
group of supplier to have major control over industry constituents. 
 
Power of Buyers  
 
The industry is characterised by low power of buyers. Like input suppliers, it is highly unlikely that any one 
group of buyers to have major control over industry constituents. 
 
The “Sixth” Force 
 
In the case of the Malaysian domestic airline market, the Government plays a key role as the regulator of the 
industry through the Ministry of Transportation and Department of Civil Aviation. At the same time, the Government 
also hold a majority a shareholding in Malaysia Airlines.  
 
COMPANY BACKGROUND   
 
AirAsia 
 
AirAsia was incorporated in 1993 by the Malaysian industrial conglomerate, DRB-Hicom and a local 
aviation company, Mofaz Air. AirAsia was designated to operate both domestically and internationally, started 
services in 1996, two years. In September 2001, DRB-Hicom sold its’ 99.75% share in AirAsia to Tune Air for 1 
Malaysian Ringgit (MYR) and assumption of 50 percent of AirAsia's net liability, while Mofaz Air retained the 
remaining 0.25% (Jaafar, 2001).  In December 2001, the sale of AirAsia was finalised and it was announced that the 
airline was going to operate on a “no frills, less expensive domestic fares” concept. (Utusan Malaysia, 2001).  
 
Malaysia Airlines 
 
When the separation of the Malaysian Singapore Airlines (MSA) occurred in 1971, two new airlines were 
formed, Singapore Airlines and Malaysia Airlines. Singapore Airlines took the international routes and assets of the 
MSA, while the domestic Malaysian routes and assets were left to Malaysia Airlines. From these limited routes and 
assets, Malaysia Airlines grew to become what is today, a full fledge full service career. In the mid 1980’s, it became 
the first state owned enterprise to be privatised when it was listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. Except for 
the period from the mid 1990 to early 2001, the airline was owned primarily by the government. 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF AIRASIA’S STRATEGIC AND ACTIONS 
 
Review of AirAsia’s Implementation Strategic Actions 
 
Upon takeover by new owners, AirAsia adapted a new operating model following  those used by other low 
cost airlines such as Southwest Airlines in the US and Ryanair and Easyjet in Europe. AirAsia offered lower fares to 
all the destinations it served compared to Malaysia Airlines. AirAsia’s fares are based on when the tickets are 
purchased. No frills services on AirAsia flights meant no complementary meals or drinks and no in-flight 
entertainment.  
 
The following reviews in detail the execution by AirAsia of the “Southwest Strategy” (Bonne, 2002). The 
details of the strategy are shown in Table 1 in the Appendix. Such a review is necessary to determine whether the 
strategy AirAsia chose was implemented properly as the operating and financial results are meaningless without the 
proper implementation of the underlying strategy behind them.  
 
No of Passengers carried 
 
The total of number of passengers carried by both AirAsia and Malaysia Airlines have gone in opposite 
directions. In AirAsia's case, the number of passengers increased from 271,000 for the period from April 2000 to 
March 2001 to 359,000 for the period from April 2001 to March 2002. For the period from April 2002 to March 2003, 
the number of passengers was 1,329,000. The increase resulted from the increase in the number of destinations served 
and the number of aircrafts used by the airline. 
 
Fleet 
 
AirAsia utilises only Boeing 737-300 aircrafts in its fleet. The airline had previously considered using Airbus 
aircrafts but decided against it. Boeing 737’s are the aircraft of choice for most major low cost airlines around the 
world. 
 
Service is limited on flights 
 
AirAsia provides very limited “free” services on its flights. Food and drinks can be bought on-board at 
affordable prices to passengers. In addition, airline souvenirs such as T-shirts, caps and pens are also sold on the 
flights. In financial year 2002, AirAsia recorded ancillary income amounting to 7.7 million MYR or about 4% of total 
revenue. In the previous financial year, ancillary income was 0.1 million MYR or less than 1% of total revenue. A 
major source of ancillary income is aircraft advertising, whereby, AirAsia aircrafts becomes a flying billboard. A deal 
done with a local telecommunication company is estimated to worth 1.8 million MYR (Prystay, 2002). 
 
Service is based one single class 
 
There is only one class on the airline’s flights – the AirAsia class, as the airline puts it. Free seating is used in 
the class to ensure that passengers board the aircrafts more timely. The airline’s major customers, Malaysians are 
known to operate to “Mexican” time. 
 
Routes are point to point 
 
AirAsia flights are all point to point. AirAsia also introduced new routes pairing the national capital, Kuala 
Lumpur with a number of destinations in East Malaysia, which were previously served (and still are) by Malaysia 
Airlines through the major airports at the two East Malaysian state capitals. These direct flights save the time, and of 
course, the money of passengers. 
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Turnaround time in airports is short 
 
AirAsia targets for a 25 minutes turnaround time, the time similar to many other low cost airlines. Its 
performance against the target has been good as shown by the statistics reported on its website.  However, one major 
problem for an airline with a limited number of aircrafts is that a delay for one flight may cause delays to the other 
flights utilising the same aircraft. Such a domino effect on the flights can have serious repercussions to passengers’ 
view of AirAsia’s services and not to mention, its turnaround target. 
 
Use of secondary airports 
 
AirAsia is unable to apply this strategy in Malaysia as there are no secondary airports in all the destinations it 
serves, with the single exception of the national capital. The airline had previously operated at the secondary airport 
until July 2002. However, in line with the government’s ambitions to make the major airport, the Kuala Lumpur 
International Airport as a major hub in the region, all airlines operating jet aircrafts to operate out of KLIA instead of 
the secondary airports. If AirAsia operates out of the secondary airport, the airline may lose access to the international 
passengers, all of who arrive in KLIA. 
 
Bookings made directly to airline 
 
AirAsia has moved away from the major traditional distribution channel of airlines, namely travel agents. 
Under previous ownership, travel agents accounted for about 70% of revenue. Under current owners, only 2% of 
revenue is from the agents. Bookings and payments are primarily made through AirAsia’s own reservations and sales 
offices, nationwide call centre and Internet website. Internet bookings currently make up 60% of all bookings. In 
August 2003, AirAsia went a step further by introducing reservations and payment via Short Messaging System 
(SMS) through mobile phone services. The airline claimed that the initiative was the first of its kind in the world. 
 
In addition to the implementation of the above strategy, AirAsia has also instituted several cost savings 
initiatives such as the following related to Khanna (2002): 
 
 Staff members are multi-task: attendants announce flight departures, pilots help to clean the plane and 
management helps to check in passengers. 
 Improved landings going from 80 landings per set of tyres to 180.  
 Improved on runway braking methods, usage of the reverse thruster and aircraft descent methods. As a result, 
AirAsia now burns 770 US gallons per hour of fuel, compared to Malaysia Airlines, using a similar plane, 
burns 1,100 US gallons. 
 Ground handling is done in-house: the Chief Executive Officer sometimes helps out in this. 
 
It is clear that AirAsia has achieved what it set out to do when it change from a full service carrier to a low 
cost airline.  Without successful implementation of the strategy, it might have not succeeded in improving its 
operating and financial performance as will be shown in the following few sub-sections.  
 
Comparison of Performance with Malaysia Airlines 
 
The following section will compare the performance of AirAsia with that of Malaysia Airlines, with respect 
to operating and financial results over the period of 2001 to 2003.  
 
Comparison of Operating Results 
 
The key data or ratios that are normally used to compare the operating performance of passenger service 
airlines are as follows: 
 
 No of Passengers carried  
 Available seat-km (SKM) - Number of available seats multiplied by distance flown (in km) 
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 Revenue passenger-km (PKM) - Number of passenger carried multiplied by distance flown (in km) 
 Passenger load factor - Revenue passenger-km expressed as a percentage of available seat-km 
 
No of Passengers carried 
 
The total of number of passengers carried by both AirAsia and Malaysia Airlines have gone in opposite 
directions. In AirAsia's case, the number of passengers increased from 271,000 for the period from April 2000 to 
March 2001 to 359,000 for the period from April 2001 to March 2002. For the period from April 2002 to March 2003, 
the number of passengers was 1,329,000. The increase resulted from the increase in the number of destinations served 
and the number of aircrafts used by the airline. 
 
For Malaysia Airlines, the number of domestic passengers decreased from 8,854,000 for the period from 
April 2000 to March 2001 to 8,645,000 in the period of April 2001 to March 2002. However, for the period from 
April 2000 to March 2001, the number of passengers has risen to 8,677,000, although, still below the figure for the 
same period two years before. According to the airline, the major reason for the decline was the effects from the 
September 11 tragedy. Malaysia Airlines maintained that the increased competition from AirAsia did not have any 
effect on the airline's operations. On further analysis, this claim is correct. When AirAsia started its service as a low 
cost airline in January 2002, Malaysia Airlines total passengers of 2,045,000 for the period from October to December 
2001 fell by about 1% to 2,021,000 for the period from January to March 2002. 
 
In terms of market share, AirAsia's has increased from 3% in the period from April 2000 to March 2001 to 
13% in the period from April 2002 to March 2003. However, in terms of absolute numbers, Malaysia Airlines have 
maintained almost the same total number of passengers for the past three years being compared. The comparison of 
number of passengers is shown in Figure 1 in the Appendix. 
 
In terms of the growth in number of passengers, obviously, AirAsia has grown tremendously. For example, 
when comparing the first half year of calendar year 2002 against first half year of calendar year 2003, the figures show 
that the number of passengers for AirAsia has increased by 54% from 454,560 to 700,000, while for Malaysia 
Airlines, the number decreased by 6% from 4,142,000 to 3,900,000. Malaysia Airlines blamed the SARS virus for the 
drop. On the other hand, AirAsia added an aircraft and three destinations during the quarter.  
 
Based on the above information, we can expect that for the short term, AirAsia will continue to carry more 
passengers as it increases the number of destinations within the country, with minimal impact to Malaysia Airlines. 
Long-term effect on Malaysia Airlines will only be possible to measure once AirAsia's expansion in the domestic is 
over.  
 
In addition, the above ratios are also reported against the number of staff that the airline employs and the 
number of aircrafts in the fleet to measure the efficiency of the airline. The resultant efficiency ratios are as follows: 
 
Available seat-km (SKM), Revenue passenger-km (PKM) and Load Factor 
 
These three ratios are interrelated. As no detail data are available for AirAsia in terms of Available seat-km 
(SKM) and Revenue passenger-km (PKM), no comparison can be made for these ratios. However, based on Load 
Factors, which is a function of both SKM and PKM, both Malaysia Airlines and AirAsia are showing similar results.  
 
In AirAsia's case, the load factor increased from 67% in the period of April 2001 to June 2002 to 70% in the 
period from July 2002 to June 2003. For Malaysia Airlines the load factor for domestic flights for periods from April 
2001 to March 2002 and from April 2002 to March 2003 were 69.3% and 74% respectively. Malaysia Airlines has 
improved its load factor although nowhere near the load factor of 79.2% achieved in the period from April 2000 to 
March 2001. It should be noted that as low cost airlines have lower cost base, an airline like AirAsia requires lower 
load factors to breakeven compared to full cost airlines like Malaysia Airlines. 
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Financial Comparison  
 
For financial performance comparison, we will review revenue and profits attained by both airlines. As 
AirAsia is a privately held company, detailed information is not readily available. However, these two data will be 
able to give an insight on the growth and profitability of the two airlines. 
 
Revenue 
 
AirAsia has shown improvement in the revenue since takeover by its new owners and implementation of low 
cost airline model. In the period from April 2000 to March 2001, revenue was 167.8 million MYR. In the period from 
April 2001 to June 2002 (AirAsia changed financial year-end from March to June, revenue grew to 222.3 million 
MYR. This is an absolute growth of 32 per cent, although on annualised basis for the same 15-month period (177.8 
million MYR for 12 months), revenue grew by 6 per cent only. However, in the period from July 2002 to June 2003, 
AirAsia chalked up a total revenue of 330 million MYR, an increase of 86 percent (absolute) or 48 per cent (over 
annualised April 2001 to June 2002 period). As pointed out earlier, increase in flights contributed to the increase in 
revenue. 
 
Malaysia Airlines also showed improvements on its domestic revenue. Revenue grew by 10 per cent from 
1,144.2 million MYR for the period from April 2000 to March 2001 to 1,263.0 million MYR for the period from April 
2001 to March 2002. In the subsequent period of from April 2002 to March 2003, revenue grew by a modest 4 per 
cent to 1,312.0 million MYR. As between 1998 and 2002, the airline has achieved between 10-14 per cent increase in 
revenue annually, the single digit increase does not bode well for the airline.    
 
The comparison between AirAsia and Malaysia Airlines revenue is shown in Figure 2 in the Appendix. 
While Malaysia Airlines has contended that AirAsia operations does not have any impact on its operations, we can 
deduce from the differences in the growth  rates that AirAsia has some impact on Malaysia Airlines domestic 
operations. 
 
Profits 
 
AirAsia has improved tremendously from the days it was under the previous owners. It was reported to have 
accumulated more than 145 million MYR of losses prior to the take over (Travel Trade Report, 2003). In the period 
from April 2001 to June 2002, the airline netted a net income of 0.232 million MYR, out of 19.1 million MYR net 
loss for the first seven months under the old owners and 19.4 million MYR net income for the second eight months 
under the new owners and new operating concept. For the period from July 2002 to June 2003, the airline recorded a 
net income of 20 million MYR.  
 
Malaysia Airlines does not keep separate profit figures for its international and domestic operations. 
Therefore, it is improbable to compare the profitability of Malaysia Airlines against AirAsia. However, it should be 
noted that from 1997 to 2002, Malaysia Airlines has raked up net losses totalling to 2,471.5 million MYR or about 
494.3 million MYR a year, with the highest net loss of 835.6 million MYR being for the period from April 2001 to 
March 2002. In the period from April 2001 to March 2002, the airline made a profit of 339.1 million MYR, primarily 
due to exceptional items (profit made on sale of aircraft leased back) and sale of aircrafts and spare engines. For the 
period from April to June 2003, Malaysia Airlines recorded a net loss of  165.5 million MYR. The outlook for the rest 
of the year does not look very well. 
 
Return on Revenue 
 
Although it is improbable to compare absolute profit figures, we can compare the returns on revenue for both 
AirAsia and Malaysia as measures of profitability. For the period from April 2001 to June 2002, AirAsia return on 
revenue is less than 1 per cent, while for Malaysia Airlines for the period from April 2001 to March 2002, return on 
revenue is negative 10 per cent.  For the period from July 2002 to June 2003, AirAsia return on revenue is 6 per cent, 
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while for Malaysia Airlines for the period from April 2001 to March 2002, return on revenue is 4 per cent. Return on 
revenue for the period from April to June 2002 is negative 10 per cent. 
 
In summary, we can conclude that based on the results of operating and financial performance, AirAsia has 
performed much better than Malaysia Airlines. However, the long-term impact of AirAsia strategy on Malaysia 
Airlines will only be clear in the years to come. AirAsia strategy has been in place less than two years. As the Chief 
Executive Officer of AirAsia puts aptly it, “Talk to me in 10 years and I will tell you if we have been a success.” 
(Thomas, 2003). 
 
Impact on Malaysia Airlines’ Share Prices 
 
Since AirAsia is not a publicly traded company, there are no shares to be tracked. However, Malaysia 
Airlines is a publicly traded company and therefore, its shares can be tracked and analysed, which will be done in the 
following.  
 
Share Price Movement 
 
Figure 3 in the Appendix shows the movement of Malaysia Airlines shares against the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE) Index (Yahoo.com, 2003). The period covered is from November 2001 to October 2003, during 
which AirAsia started operating as a low cost airline. As Malaysia Airlines is a constituent of the KLSE Index, we see 
that the prices of the airline’s shares follow the movement of the KLSE Index.  
 
Analysis of Share Prices  
 
Two key events in AirAsia’s operations for the past two years are the announcement that the airline will 
become a low cost airline on 15 January 2001 and the announcement of operating results of the first year of operations 
on 15 January 2003. In early July 2003, AirAsia also announced its results for the second year of operations.  Based 
on the share price movement for Malaysia Airlines during these three periods, it is found that only during the first 
announcement in January 2002 was the share price affected somewhat adversely, i.e. going down after the 
announcement. In the other announcements in January 2003 and July 2003, the share prices went up.  Table 2 in the 
Appendix shows Malaysia Airlines share prices for the two weeks within the three announcements. 
 
We can presume that AirAsia did not have much effect on Malaysia Airlines share prices. One possible 
reason is the scope and size of Malaysia Airlines. Both airlines are of different sizes. Malaysia Airlines operates 
domestic and international flights with the bulk of revenues from the international services. For example, for the 
period from April 2002 to March 2003, international flights accounted for about 81.5% of the airline’s revenue from 
passenger operations. 
 
Valuation Of AirAsia 
 
The final part of this section will examine the estimated values of AirAsia. 
 
Valuation Basis 
 
According to Fleming (2003, 130-133), there are various methods to evaluate privately held companies, with 
the “recent” transaction and price/earning (P/E) multiple methods being the main ones. 
 
“Recent” transaction method 
 
In June 2003, three foreign investors acquired 26% of AirAsia for the price of 98.8 million MYR. Thus, 
valuation of AirAsia based on this transaction is 380 million MYR. An earlier value is about 40 million MYR based 
on the debt amount assumed by the new owners to obtain 99.25% of AirAsia in December 2001.  
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Price/earning multiple method 
 
Typical P/E used for valuation are “prevailing P/E multiple of matched firm” (Fleming, 132). However, one 
problem with this method is the availability of comparable publicly traded companies similar to the company being 
valued (Ryan 1989, 72). To value AirAsia, we can adopt a P/E used for a valuation of another low cost airline, Virgin 
Blue, which currently valued using Ryanair and easyJet P/E multiple of up to 17 times for 2004 (Hares, 2003). Based 
on the earnings of AirAsia for the period from July 2002 to June 2003 of 20 million MYR, the valuation of AirAsia is 
about 340 million MYR. 
 
Growth in Value 
 
Based on the above, we can estimate that the value of AirAsia has grown from about 40 million MYR in late 
2001 to between 340-380 million MYR to mid 2003. In over one and a half years, AirAsia has grown in value by 
almost 8.5-9.5 times. On the other hand, based on shares outstanding and closing prices, Malaysia Airlines value has 
doubled from 2,479.4 million in January 2002 to 4,912.7 million MYR in July 2003. Obviously, AirAsia has grown 
more than Malaysia Airlines. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the final analysis, we can conclude that AirAsia has successfully implemented its new strategy within its 
own rights, without affecting the incumbent, Malaysia Airlines. However, the impact of AirAsia strategic actions on 
Malaysian Airlines in the long term remains to be seen. AirAsia, still in its expansion phase, has seen its revenue, 
profits, passengers and value increase spectacularly in the past 22 months of operations as a low cost airline.  
 
One of the key success factors is the people behind the transformation. The Chief Executive Officer, Tony 
Fernandes, has created a positive environment in the airline. He was ably advised by the Connor McCarthy, the former 
Chief Operating Officer of Ryanair, another low cost airline. Cost management is an important element in the airline 
management. Tony Fernandez has often said that cost, not other airlines, is AirAsia’s enemy. 
 
It will be interesting to follow AirAsia’s future as it plans to go regional in South East Asia. Even before 
leaving Malaysia, AirAsia is already greeted by the major airlines in the region by these airlines’ plans to start their 
own low cost units. In addition to other smaller airlines, this will be an interesting development to follow. We shall 
see if AirAsia can keep everyone flying around the region as it did in Malaysia under the company’s tagline of “Now 
Everyone Can Fly”. 
 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
Table 1: The "Southwest Strategy" 
 
The “Southwest Strategy” 
Fleet is made up of one type of aircraft 
Service is limited on flights i.e. no free drinks or food or entertainment 
Service is based one single class i.e. no premium or business class 
Routes are point to point 
Turnaround time (from touchdown to takeoff) in airports is short 
Airports used are secondary airports and not major ones 
Bookings made directly to airline, usually online, and not through travel agents 
Source: Boone (2002) 
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Figure 1: Number Of Passengers, 2001-2003 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Revenues, 2001-2003 
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Figure 2: Movement Of Malaysia Airlines And Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Index 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Malaysia Airlines Closing Prices & Volumes On Selected Dates 
 
Date 
Closing 
Price Volume Date 
Closing 
Price Volume Date 
Closing 
Price Volume 
15-Jul-03 4.40 629,300 23-Jan-03 3.90 438,000 24-Jan-02 2.95 286,000 
14-Jul-03 4.40 820,600 22-Jan-03 3.92 352,000 23-Jan-02 2.95 466,000 
11-Jul-03 4.40 287,300 21-Jan-03 3.80 274,000 22-Jan-02 2.98 103,000 
10-Jul-03 4.36 139,000 20-Jan-03 3.64 127,000 21-Jan-02 2.99 164,000 
9-Jul-03 4.38 232,000 17-Jan-03 3.68 382,000 18-Jan-02 3.04 188,000 
8-Jul-03 4.42 1,373,700 16-Jan-03 3.68 375,000 17-Jan-02 3.08 204,000 
7-Jul-03 4.42 2,145,400 15-Jan-03 3.62 482,000 16-Jan-02 3.00 424,000 
4-Jul-03 4.40 2,803,200 14-Jan-03 3.54 425,000 15-Jan-02 3.06 403,000 
3-Jul-03 4.28 2,792,400 13-Jan-03 3.52 1,305,000 14-Jan-02 3.04 216,000 
2-Jul-03 4.00 443,500 10-Jan-03 3.40 878,000 11-Jan-02 3.02 615,000 
1-Jul-03 3.92 732,600 9-Jan-03 3.36 67,000 10-Jan-02 3.12 239,000 
30-Jun-03 3.94 1,754,200 8-Jan-03 3.32 78,000 9-Jan-02 3.16 1,063,000 
27-Jun-03 3.94 2,026,300 7-Jan-03 3.28 297,000 8-Jan-02 3.08 1,183,000 
26-Jun-03 3.90 445,100    7-Jan-02 3.16 633,000 
Note: Announcement Date in Bold 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – December 2005                                 Volume 4, Number 12 
 64 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Bonne, J. (2002). The airline business doesn’t work … but low-cost, short-haul airlines are changing the 
equation. MSNBC, 5 December 2002.  http://www.msnbc.com/news/843222.asp?cp1=1 [Accessed 10 
September 2003] 
2. Fleming, G. (2003). Class notes for venture capital and private equity course (FINM7040) Canberra : The 
Australian National University 
3. Hares, S. (2003).  Patrick win shrinks Virgin Blue Australia float. Reuters News, 25 July 2003  
http://factiva.com/ [Accessed 15 October 2003] 
4. Jaafar, F. (2001) DRB-Hicom sold AirAsia (Original article in Malay language titled ”DRB-Hicom jual 
AirAsia”). Utusan Malaysia, 6 September 2001.  
http://www.utusan.com.my/utusan/archive.asp?y=2001&dt=0907&pub=utusan_malaysia&sec=korporat&pg
=ko_01.htm&arc=hive [Accessed 15 September 2003] 
5. Khanna, V. (2003). The no-frills CEO. The Business Times online edition, 5 July 2003  http://business-
timestest.asia1.com.sg/ story/0,4567,86676,00.html [Accessed 15 October 2003] 
6. Malaysia Airlines (2002). Annual Report 2001/2002. Malaysia Airlines : Kuala Lumpur 
7. Malaysia Airlines (2003). Annual Report 2002/2003. Malaysia Airlines : Kuala Lumpur 
8. Porter, M.E. (1980). Competitive Strategy. New York: The Free Press 
9. Prystay, C. (2002) The Sky's the Limit. The Far Eastern Economics Review, 5 December 2002 
10. Ryan, C.R. (1989) Cashing in your chips: how to profitably sell your business. Homewood, Illinois : Dow 
Jones-Irwin 
11. Sakran, S. (2002). A flying start. Malaysian Business, 16 July 2002, pp.23-34.  http://proquest.umi.com/ 
[Accessed 12 September 2003] 
12. Thomas, G. (2003) In tune with low fares in Malaysia. Air Transport World online  http://www.atwonline. 
com/archives/contents/archive_contents_may03.cfm [Accessed 15 October 2003] 
13. Travel Trade Report (2003). Air Asia plans no-frills services to BKK. Travel Trade Report online, 8 January 
2003  http://www.ttreport.com/Newsfiles_2003/January03_news/airasia_bkk_jan8.htm [Accessed 15 
October 2003] 
14. Utusan Malaysia (2001), Less frills and more cheaper domestic air fares, says Tune Air. Utusan Malaysia, 12 
December 2001.  http://www.utusan.com.my/utusan/archive.asp?y=2001&dt=1213& 
pub=utusan_express&sec=corporate&pg=co_02.htm&arc=hive [Accessed 15 September 2003] 
15. Yahoo.com (2003). Shares and Index data for Malaysian Airlines and Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange.  
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/bc?t=2y&s=%5EKLSE&l=on&z=m&q=l&c=MASM.KL  [Accessed 25 and 30 
October 2003] 
 
